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ARGUMENT 
Review of respondent's brief in this matter demonstrates that both parties agree on 
the standard of review, though there seems to be a different understanding regarding what 
parts of the standard deserve emphasis. Petitioners believe on appeal, a board of 
adjustment will be found to have exercised its discretion within the proper boundaries 
unless its decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Further, "the court shall affirm the 
decision of the board. . . if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the 
record." UCA section 17-27-708(6) (1991) (emphasis added). See Patterson v. Utah 
County Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), Springville 
Citizens v. Springville, 979 P.2d 332, 336 (Utah 1999). 
I. PETITIONERS HAVE URGED THE CORRECT DEFINITION OF A LOT OR 
PARCEL THAT "QUALIFIES AS LAND IN AGRICULTURAL USE." 
In comparing the memoranda filed by the parties, the first major point of dispute is 
over what portion of the Farmland Assessment Act should be used to determine what 
constitutes "land in agricultural use." Respondent urges the definition used in UCA 59-2-
502 (4), while petitioners urge the definition set forth in UCA 59-2-503. In deciding 
which of the definitions to use, the starting point is to consider the requirements of both 
UCA section 17-27-806 and UCZO section 3-53 (B). Utah Code Annotated section 17-
27-806(2) A states as follows: 
(a) Subject to subsection (2)(b), a lot or parcel resulting from a division of 
agricultural land is exempt from the plat requirements of §17-27-804 if the lot 
or parcel: (i) qualifies as land in agricultural use under Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 
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5, Farmland Assessment Act; (ii) meets the minimum size requirement of 
applicable zoning ordinances for agricultural uses; and (iii) is not used and will 
not be used for any nonagricultural purpose, (emphasis added). 
Under UCA section 59-2-503, titled "Qualifications for Agricultural Use 
Valuation', the land must be at least 5 acres, be actively devoted to agricultural use, and 
must have been in agricultural use for the preceding two years. Petitioner's application 
meets all of these requirements. 
Utah County relies on a definition of "land in agricultural use" found at UCA 59-
2-502(l)(a). (R. at331). 
(1) "Land in Agricultural Use" means: (a) land devoted to the raising of useful 
plants and animals with a reasonable expectation of profit, including: (i) forages 
and sod corps; (ii) grains and feed crops; (iii) livestock as defined in §59-2-102; 
(iv) trees and fruits; or (v) vegetables, nursery, floral, and ornamental stock; or 
land devoted to and meeting the requirements and qualifications for payments or 
other compensation under a crop-land retirement program with an agency of the 
state or federal government. 
Even using the Respondent's definitions, the only dispute is over the "reasonable 
expectation of profit." While the evidence in the record, as set forth in petitioner's prior 
brief, demonstrates Petitioner's compliance under either standard, there is a difficulty 
with relying on the definition urged by Utah County. The difficulty is that 17-27-806(2) 
A contains the word "qualifies." Land in Agricultural Use under UCA 59-2-502 is not 
qualifying land. That section does not contain the requirements for "qualifying" They 
are contained in UCA section 59-2-503. One of the key differences between the two 
sections is a backward rather than a forward look. Section 59-2-503 (l)(b)(ii) looks at 
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whether the land has been devoted to agricultural use for the preceding two years. By 
looking at the past two years for determining qualification, no speculation about 
profitability is required. 
Under either definition, the only evidence was that petitioner's land "qualifies as 
land in agricultural use." As a starting proposition, that fact is established because it is 
uncontested that the land is already in greenbelt as grazing land. It is already qualifying 
land. The evidence clearly showed that the land is subject to restrictive covenants 
requiring agricultural use. (R. at 103-102). 
Utah County's desire to look forward at profitability, rather than backward, is 
understandable. The county desires prevention of non-agricultural uses which might 
occur in the future. This goal, while laudable, is misplaced. It is akin to denying a 
developer a building permit because a future owner of the property might open a brothel. 
Petitioner can't perfectly control whether a future landowner will continue to use the land 
for agricultural purposes. Petitioner has done what can be done, which is to place 
restrictive covenants on the property which require continued agricultural use. (R. at 
103-102). Petitioner has also obtained the grazing lease, allowing the current agricultural 
use to continue. (R. at 92-90). The tax penalties for losing greenbelt are already in 
place. There is nothing further petitioner can do to insure continued agricultural use. 
II. THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. 
Respondent Utah County argues that the decision of the board of adjustment is 
supported by substantial evidence in the record. (Brief of Appellee at page 20). In 
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supporting this claim, the County makes four arguments. First, the "resulting lots or 
parcels will lack water and will not support dry farming." Second, the "resulting parcels 
will be small in size." Third, the "resulting lots or parcels will be remotely located. 
Finally, the County claims support for the finding that "resulting lots or parcels will not 
support grazing." (Brief of Appellee pgs 22-24). An examination of the record, 
however, demonstrates that the decision of the Board of Adjustment was not supported 
by substantial evidence. 
The first finding, which respondent claims, dealing with the lack of water, is not 
relevant. There is no requirement in either the Utah County Zoning Ordinance nor the 
Utah Code requiring water. Petitioners have never indicated that the lots would have 
water. The historic use of the property has been grazing, and is anticipated to continue to 
be grazing. If purchasers take the property out of grazing, it will be their responsibility to 
insure continued agricultural use. 
The second finding has to do with the size of the lots. The finding is that the lots 
are small. The lots for which petitioners have sought approval vary from 5 to 8 acres. (R. 
at 289, 295-296). Under the Utah County Ordinance at the time petitioners filed their 
application, the minimum lot size in the applicable zone was 5 acres. That zone has since 
been raised to 50 acres. Respondents claim that this finding regarding size is supported 
by substantial evidence in the record, but have only cited the findings of the county 
commission. (R. at 86). This lack of other support simply begs the issue set forth in 
petitioner's prior memorandum regarding what constitutes evidence in the record. 
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The third finding that the county claims is supported, is that the "resulting parcels 
will be remotely located." (Appellee's brief at 24). This finding involves an issue that is 
not contested. Remoteness is not prohibited in either county or state law. Again, the 
evidence claimed is the unsupported statements of the Utah County Commission. This 
finding fails to consider the fact that the parcels are remotely located under existing 
zoning and that the property already qualifies for agricultural assessment. 
The final piece of evidence that the county claims is supported is that the 
"resulting lots or parcels will not support grazing." (Brief of Appellant at p. 24). The first 
evidence claimed to support this finding is a statement by David Shawcroft (a deputy 
county attorney), questioning whether the property qualifies as an agricultural 
subdivision. (R. at 66). The second was a statement by Bill Ferguson, a member of the 
planning commission, opining that petitioner would not qualify for grazing on a five acre 
lot. (R. at 66). The third claim of evidence is a statement from Jason Ivins, quoting the 
county assessor, who purportedly stated that the subject real property is currently in 
classification four which requires 1.1 cows for 2 months out of the year to keep the 
property in greenbelt. (R. at 66). Planning Commissioner Ferguson stated that the land 
would not support 1.1 cows for two months out of the year right now. (R. at 66). Jason 
Ivins responded that it may not (support cows) right now, but that is why greenbelt does 
not require it. R. at 66. The statements referenced above constitute the only support 
respondents claim for the finding of fact. Petitioners have objected to this evidence. (R. 
at 407-409). 
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The evidence claimed by Utah County does not meet the standard for admissible 
evidence. Respondents argue that the Rules of Evidence do not apply, but then argue that 
petitioners have made statements against interest. (Brief of Appellee at 30, 31). Rule 
603 of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires an oath or affirmation that the witness will 
testify truthfully. There is no indication that the statements are made from personal 
knowledge. Pursuant to Rule 602 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: "a witness may not 
testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the 
witness has personal knowledge of the matter. " (emphasis added). There is no 
foundation for the claimed evidence. The claimed evidence from Planning 
Commissioner Ferguson came from a person with the responsibility of deciding the issue. 
The statement of Jason Ivins is clearly hearsay, which is prohibited under Rule 801 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. Finally, the statements constitute improper opinion testimony 
under Rule 701 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Applying the above evidentiary rules, 
none of the claimed evidence should be considered. As set forth in Petitioner's prior 
brief, even if the evidence is admitted, Petitioners meet all applicable standards. 
Respondents have not claimed evidentiary support for any of the other findings. 
Presumably, this is a concession that they are not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record. 
III. PETITIONER HAS NOT MADE ADMISSIONS WHICH SHOULD BE 
CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL 
At the board of adjustment level, Respondent Utah County failed to put on 
evidence in support of the findings of the planning commission and city council. The 
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failure to put on evidence was recognized by the Board of Adjustment. The board 
specifically found that: 
. . . The County did not present evidence regarding the requirement of §3-53-B-I(b)ii 
regarding concerns that property is not used and will not be used for any non-agricultural 
purpose. (R. at 331 paragraph 5). 
In its brief, respondent Utah County attempts to excuse its failure to put on 
evidence by arguing that petitioner made admissions which should be considered as part 
of the record. Strangely, while claiming Petitioners have made admissions which should 
be considered part of the record, the County fails to indicate just what admissions were 
made, and what fact those admissions supposedly proved. 
Respondent supports its argument, regarding the admissions that were supposedly 
made, by claiming that Petitioner has waived any objections to its admissions. (Brief of 
Respondent at page 29). The trouble with this argument is, first, that whatever these 
supposed admissions were, they were apparently not relied on by the Board of 
Adjustment as they were not referenced as support for the findings of the board. (R. at 
331). Second, assuming the admissions are the statements made by Jason Ivins at the 
Planning Commission Hearing, when considered in context they are not admissions 
against interest. The statements are that a "grazing four" designation requires 1.1 cows 
on five acres of land for two months of the year. (R. at 66). The second is a response to 
a planning commissioner that it (the land) may not support 1.1 cows on five acres right 
now, but that green belt does not require it. (R. at 66). Considered in context, all this 
supposed admission says is that 5 acres should be able to support 1.1 cows for two 
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months sometime during the year, but not specifically at the time of the hearing. This is 
really not an admission so much as a statement of established fact. The subject property 
is already in Greenbelt and is classified as grazing four. That means it has already been 
established by the county assessor that the land will support 1.1 cows on five acres for 
two months. 
Respondent's next argument is that the Rules of Evidence do not apply to 
Administrative Hearings. (Brief of Respondent at 30). This claim is hard to reconcile 
with the fact that respondent's argument is a claim of an admission by a party opponent 
pursuant to Rule 801 (d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. If the rules don't apply, then 
there are no admissions. If the rules do apply, then all of the rules of evidence should 
apply and the supposed admissions should be excluded as set forth in petitioner's prior 
memoranda. 
The best approach to considering what should or should not be considered as 
evidence may be the approach set forth in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney 818 P.2d 
23, 29 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Under that standard it is incumbent on the administrative 
body to determine what evidence should be admitted. In the case at bar, there is nothing 
in the record to indicate that the administrative body made any analysis regarding what 
should or should not be admitted. There is also no evidence in the record that the 
administrative body relied on the admissions claimed by petitioner. 
The respondent's final argument is that Petitioner's statements are admissions by a 
party opponent. This argument is based on Rule 801(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of 
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Evidence. The trouble with this argument is that if the Rules of Evidence apply as set 
forth in this portion of Respondent's argument, the statements would be inadmissible 
under the Rules as set forth in Petitioner's prior memoranda. The reality, in the case at 
bar, is that while it is true Respondent does not have a burden of proof, the findings of the 
Board of Adjustment must be supported by substantial evidence in the record, and they 
are not. The only evidence was from Petitioner, and that evidence supports Petitioner's 
compliance with the statutes and ordinances necessary to require approval of the map. 
IV. THIS COURT HAS DISCRETION TO CONSIDER THE PROCEEDINGS 
BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT. 
Respondent argues in its brief that this court should simply ignore any errors in the 
proceedings before the district court. While it is true that this court does not give any 
deference to the district court, and performs its review as though it came directly from the 
Board of Adjustment, {Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment 893 P.2d 603), that 
does not render the proceedings before the district court irrelevant. If that were the case, 
there would be no reason for the legislature to have made the district court the court of 
first appeal in board of adjustment cases. The kind of appellate court review set forth in 
Patterson presupposes that the case is properly before the appellate court. 
In the case at bar, respondent failed to oppose petitioner's statement of material 
facts. Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that: "Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by 
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citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials" Rule 7 also 
states that: "Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted 
for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the responding party." In 
the case at bar petitioner set forth a Statement of Uncontested Material Facts. (R. at 379-
381). Respondent also set forth a Statement of Uncontested Material Facts petitioner 
does not oppose. (R. at 399-403). Respondent opposes some of petitioner's facts, but 
has failed to "provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by 
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials" Respondent 
also ignored the requirement that it set forth separately numbered facts supported by 
citation to affidavits and other materials as required by Rule 7. 
Respondents failed to raise issues of material fact regarding the petitioner's 
statement of facts in accordance with the rules, and so those facts are admitted for 
summary judgment purposes. The trial court should have granted summary judgment for 
petitioner. Despite the standard of review on appeal, this court has discretion to reverse 
the trial court rather than do as respondent asks and pretend that the trial court does not 
exist. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing facts and argument, Petitioners move this court to reverse 
the court's ruling, and the decision of the Utah County Board of Adjustment, and direct 
the Utah County Commission to execute petitioner's map. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / day of February, 2005. 
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